

CHAPTER TWO
UNDOING THE 'OLD WORLD':
THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE IN COLONIAL
AND POST-COLONIAL ALGERIA
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1. Introduction

The overall effect of colonial language policies, in ecological terms, was the destruction of the habitat of languages traditionally spoken and the imposition of a linguistic monoculture. At the same time, the colonial system created a sufficiently large population of educated Westernized people to perpetuate these practices after the nominal end of colonialism. Their views on language in many instances were far removed from those of traditional modes of communication and characterized by European ideas above both the structure and functions of language. Planning language meant planning uniformity, modernization, national identity and the like. (Muhlhausler 1996:196)

The points discussed in this chapter are fleshed out in the above epigraph. Language planning in modern Algeria has tended to continue colonial practices. I will, therefore, study colonial language policies and their appropriation in the post-independence era. The politics of language in Algeria's colonised and decolonised histories will be carefully contextualised within the socio-political reality of the time-space under study. Using both a historical approach and an interdisciplinary perspective, I will analyse the discourses, ideological debates, legislative texts and political developments of the historical moments investigated here. Arguments will be drawn from both literary works and post-colonial and socio-linguistic studies. Also, the discourse of prominent figures from colonising and colonised societies will illustrate their behaviour as representative of the period they were living in.

This chapter consists of two main parts. The first one deals with colonial history and France's policies of Frenchification by focusing on the disruptions to the colony's linguistic ecology, the colonisers' discourses on their Algerian identity and the ideological indoctrination of colonised elites. The second part of the chapter presents Algeria's national history and its policy of Arabisation. It addresses the question of national identity raised by insecure elites who had suffered colonialism as a trauma, the policy of Arabisation as the image of Frenchification, post-colonial unplanned developments, and Algeria's recent changes in language planning. However, before studying the country's colonial and national histories, I will first introduce a few concepts related to the central issues discussed in

this work.

2.Theoretical preliminaries

Among the conceptual tools defined here, there are “language planning” and related notions such as “social change”, “identity”, “ideology” and “colonialism”. Language planning refers to deliberate efforts to change a community's language use/behaviour in the future. It imposes one or more languages to achieve linguistic, political and social aims. As conscious intervention, language planning seeks “language spread” which allows the institutionalised language to increase in both its “uses” in education, political institutions, publishing and media, and its “users” as speakers or readers and writers (Cooper 1982:6). The diffusions of uses and users are called “status planning” and “acquisition planning” respectively. Moreover, language planning seeks socio-political change by influencing society's and an individual's identity (Cooper 1989; Pool 1979).

The concept of “identity” refers to an individual's or group's sense of who they are, in their “own eyes and in other people's” (Joseph 2004:13-14). Language forms a significant defining characteristic of a person's or community's identity, even though a number of other cultural factors (religion, family, name, etc.) may assume comparable importance to that of language (Smolicz and Secombe 2003). The literature on linguistic identity, in both interactional and anthropological socio-linguistics, shows that linguistic signs (language code) used in a particular interactional moment (speech event) signal meaning: they express regular social relationships that help in the identification of individuals as members of a particular group (Mortimer and Wortham 2015; Ricento 2013). Contrary to the earlier studies which treated identity as a fixed set of attributes, more recent (poststructuralist) approaches view identity as something forged by language/discourse and in a constant process revealed by identity “adjustments”, and by “multiple” identities (Edwards 2009; Joseph 2004).

As for the word “ideology”, it concerns beliefs shared by individuals or groups of people about the workings of society. “Language ideology” refers to an individual's or group's conceptions about language (its nature, structure and use) and about the place of communicative behaviour in social life, and their conceptions' manifestation in certain social and cultural values. Language ideology and identity have implications for both language planning and the dynamic of disqualification in multilingual situations (Garrett 2010). “Linguistic inequality”, Jan Blommaert (2006:516) writes, “starts as soon as someone's repertoire is disqualified as ‘nonlanguage’ or denied the status of ‘full languageness’.” Oppressive linguistic policies can produce ideological minority views that elevate the mother tongue as a

marker of “We-group” building or contested/oppositional identities. Colonial systems often produce such reactions.

2.1 Colonialism and the linguistic habitat

The term “colonialism” can be defined as foreign domination characterised by the forcible relocation of a minority of exogenous people into a new territory inhabited by an indigenous population. In this system:

The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of an ordained mandate to rule. (Osterhammel 2005:16-17)

This quote contains three important elements. First, an entire “peripheral” community becomes subordinate to the “metropolis”. Second, colonisers make no cultural concessions to the colonised. Third, invaders rationalise their domination as a “mission” to “civilise” the “barbarians”. This rhetoric lays the foundations of the “ideology of minorisation” which creates the inferior “Other-ness”, and the colonisers’ belief in their racial and cultural superiority (Osterhammel 2005; Rath 1993).

There are various forms of colonialism but only one category is preferred in the present context: “overseas settlement colonialism”. In this colonial type, the metropolis uses its military and economic superiority to support a settler minority which acquires political dominance at the expense of local peoples who are demographically superior but dispossessed of their best lands. The intruders employ a “logic of elimination” to annihilate the natives physically and/or culturally (MacQueen 2007:3; Osterhammel 2005:6-9). Also, they declare the conquered country “rulerless” (Resnullius), claim the lands as their own and become the natives of the colony as African, American, etc. Thus, colonisers disqualify the colonised as their equals, and share a “colonialist thought” (mentality) based on racist theory and biological determinism.

In the past, language scholars magnified ideas about linguistic difference, and devised notions like the African, Oriental, and Arab “character” and the myth of the “lazy natives” (Osterhammel 2005:109). These categories allowed 19th-century Europe to create itself in opposition to the “East” (Asia and Africa). Their discourses of orientalism represent the “collection of dreams, images, and vocabularies available to anyone who has tried to talk about [the East]” (Said 2003:73). David Spurr (1993:1) writes: “The particular languages which belong to [the historical process of

colonisation], enabling it while simultaneously being generated by it, are known collectively as colonial discourse.”Recent research enjoys using “colonial discourse”to examine different source material:administrative files, the press, travel writing, fictional literature, etc.(Osterhammel 2005). It also investigates the mentalities of those involved with the colonial situation characterised by both brutal force and“pseudo-justifications and stereotyped behaviours”(Spurr 1993:6).

Colonial expansionism also means linguistic imperialism which imposes the colonists' language and culture to eliminate indigenous cultures and tongues. Mother-tongue eradication comes with negative linguistic judgements(“Otherness”)and“the rhetorical opposition between ‘good’ European languages and‘bad’ African ones”(Blommaert 1999:28). However, “[t]he first manifestation of European linguistic imperialism”, Peter Muhlhausler(1996:77) claims, “is not the reduction of the quantity of indigenous languages but the destruction of the region's linguistic ecology.”Einar Haugen(1972:325)defines“language ecology”as“the study of interactions between any given language and its environment”. To him, “the true environment of a language is the society that uses it as one of its codes”. This concept refers, thus, to the study of languages in relation to one another and to their broader social, linguistic, educational, historical and political contexts(Vandenbussche, Jahr and Trudgill 2013).

2.2 Colonial ideologies and legacies

The end of European colonialism is often regarded as not yet complete. In language matters, elites in the post-independent era often maintain their loyalty to colonial ideologies and to the ex-colonial language. Robert Phillipson(1992:128)argues that“the colonized people have internalized the language and many of the attitudes of their masters, in particular their attitude to the dominant language and the dominated languages.”This “colonized mentality”appears clearly in one post-colonial development called“elite closure”:the rich and well-connected secure education in the ex-colonial language to provide their offspring with the best careers, while the children of the masses struggle to find decent jobs because of their education in the institutionalised (national and/or official) language which lacks social and economic capital (Jaffe 2006).

As regards the main colonial ideologies manipulated by colonisers, they all stem from an essentialist philosophical position which produces belief in the supremacy of one's race, culture, language, etc.(Jaffe 2006; Janicki 1993). For present purposes, only three colonial ideologies are considered here, as identified by Luisa Martin Rojo (2010:250-264). The first one, called the“ideology of ethnicization”, is synonymous with the abovementioned“ideology of

minorisation”which seeks to divide and rule people.

The second ideology, the “ideology of monolingualism”, is taken as a norm enshrined in language planning. As an element of nation-building, it defines group membership with a single language tied to a unitary identity, and any inconsequential differentiation must be erased in the name of communication efficiency and national unity. The monolingual ideology rhymes thus with homogeneity, particularly with standardisation or “normative monolingualism”(Irvine and Gall 2000:76). The latter has insidious objectives: to ensure people's allegiance to the fatherland and the colonial empire, planners use “language governmentality” to “regulate the language use, thought, and action of different people, groups, and organizations”(Pennycook 2006:65). Normative monolingualism is also associated with the social distribution of capital in the Bourdieusard perspective: highly valued linguistic varieties have a certain “cultural capital”, but they are not available to all members of society (Martin Rojo 2010:257). In this inclusion/exclusion process, schools have an agent role in the colonial context (segregationist policies) and in the post-colonial era (elite closure).

The third and final colonial ideology is the “ideology of language hierarchies”, a companion to racial categorisation typical of 19th-century ethnocentrism (Van den Avenne 2012:2-5). At the time, European producers of discourse were convinced that some “developed” nations had better languages than other tongues deemed inferior (Coulmas 1989:181; Robins 1979:175-176). In Europe, the French have probably the most elaborate ideology of language hierarchies often traced to the Academie Francaise, Rivarol, the Revolution, etc. (Phillipson 2003; Wardhaugh 1987). In colonial Algeria, France used it in unrestrained terms and associated it with the ideologies of ethnicization and monolingualism to disrupt the colony's language habitat.

3. Disruptions to Algeria's linguistic ecology

In 1830, the French conquered Algeria which went on to become an integral part of the metropolis in 1848. In 1840, Marshal Bugeaud was appointed Algeria's governor-general and military commander to ruthlessly conclude the seizure of this territory which was strongly defended by its natives. The Marshal confirmed France's overseas settlement and colonialism by encouraging the relocation of colons (colonists), and forcibly expropriating local lands (Horne 1987). To him, total colonisation meant total war, and he made the colonial project a reality thanks to an army which grew from 37,000 in 1830 to 107,000 in 1847 (Harchi 2004).

Bugeaud felt no inhibition in using genocidal methods as he planned to turn the conquered land into “a vast cemetery”(Hussey 2014:100). Parliamentarians and anthropologists shared his ideas: the former called for a “war of extermination” and the latter hoped to see a future “Algeria without Algerians”(Brower 2012:61). Between 1830 and 1871, 825,000 Algerians died as war victims and 250,000 disappeared as a result of emigration, the destruction of traditional solidarity, drought, famines and epidemics. Estimated at three million in 1830, the indigenous population had decreased by one third by around 1871 (Kateb 2010). The French army's brutality was accompanied by seizure of lands ceded to settlers from France and southern Europe (Corsica, Italy, Spain, Malta, etc.). Their number increased rapidly, from 25,000 during the 1830-1840 period to 245,000 in 1871, 781,000 in 1940 and around one million in the 1950s (Horne 1987). Greedy for land, these colonists declared Algeria *Res-nullius* to delegitimise the natives, eliminate them physically and grab their properties (Hussey 2014).

Since 1529, Algeria had been under a loose suzerainty of Ottoman military rule, controlled via tribal segments and urban aristocracies—under the Turks, activities were exclusively geared towards agriculture and nomadism, and only 5-6% of the total population lived in cities (Ruedy 1992). With military violence and land expropriation, France dismantled Algeria's age-old social organisation based on 516 tribes (Harbi 1994). Urban elites (bourgeoisie, religious and military rulers) disappeared with the collapse of their milieu deserted by its inhabitants. Cities lost the richest and most educated segments of their populations, and the Turkish establishment estimated at 15,000 departed for Turkey in 1830 (Kateb 2010; Ruedy 1992). The urban habitat was reconfigured by colonists who replaced the natives and outnumbered them until the mid-20th century (Hussey 2014; Wesseling 2009).

The French also disrupted Algeria's linguistic situation. Prior to 1830, Literary Arabic was common to all as the language of their Islamic faith. Moreover, half of the rural population spoke local Arabic and the other spoke half-Berber varieties (Valensi 1969). Interestingly, between the Arab conquest in the 7th century and the French invasion, Arabic failed to displace Berber completely despite its high prestige as the language of Islam. In fact, the traditional system did not require the masses to have a native competency in Arabic. It was internalised for religious needs and for reaching out to the Muslim world (*umma*), while mother tongues remained for day-to-day communicative interactions outside religion. Normative monolingualism and attendant language governmentality were quite alien to Algerians at the time. This linguistic tolerance also coloured the few

urban centres, situated mainly along the Mediterranean coast. According to contemporaries, Algiers was home to approximately fifteen languages between the 16th and the 19th centuries (de Haedo 1998).

Thus, French imperialism transformed Algeria's linguistic profile. With the elimination of one third of the population, the Berber-speaking community decreased dramatically: estimated at 50 in 1830, it fell to 18.6 when France left in 1962 (Chaker 1998). Furthermore, brutal force went hand in hand with the denigration of the natives' traditional values, particularly Islam and the Arabic language. For example, in 1862, the Orientalist Ernest Renan (1862:27) wrote: "Islam is the complete negation of Europe; Islam is fanaticism." Then in 1897, the Minister of Public Education outlined his department's activities in Algeria: "[The] conquest will be by the School: this should ensure the predominance of our language over the various local idioms ... and replace ignorance and fanatical prejudices by the simple but precise notions of European science." (Colonna 1975:40)

3.1 Disorganisation of the traditional schooling system

The other disruption to Algeria's linguistic ecology concerns the traditional schooling system ripped apart by the French. Yet, until 1830, it had served local purposes quite well since literacy in Arabic stood at 40-50% (ordon 1978). Colonialism affected education in two different ways. First, traditional schools collapsed between the 1840s and the end of the 19th century. Around 1850, the literacy rate was almost halved, then it worsened further when the administration fell into the hands of European civilians in 1871 (Colonna 1975). Second, Muslim parents adopted systematic "resistance-refusal" which lasted until the 1920s. They were suspicious of France's secular education seen as an evangelistic policy to de-Islamise children (Djeghloul 1986). Their mistrust was reinforced when France passed a law in 1883 to systematise declericalized education and disseminate standard French in primary schools. This Act imposed the exclusive use of French for Muslim school children, and it explicitly dismissed Arabic: "The Arabic language could only be taught after class hours" (Lanly 1970:18). So, the indigenous youth did not join colonial education in large numbers. Compared to European enrolments in French language schools, Muslim enrolments remained very low until World War I (WWI) when they increased slowly, from 3,172 in 1882 to 32,517 in 1907 (see Figure 2.1). These figures are fairly insignificant because there were 730,000 native children of primary-school age in 1908. As for Europeans who attended primary schools, there were 40,468 non-French and 60,137 French children in 1900-1901 (Lanly 1970).

Negative attitudes towards French education changed after WWI during which Muslims served in the French army or replaced conscripted French workers. Both conscripts and workers quickly realised the importance of modern education for social advancement. By 1920 to 1922 the demand had increased for more French education (Colonna 1975). However, this evolution did not meet with an ambitious educational plan because the colons refused it (see Figure 2.1), and when they tolerated it, they preferred segregationist schools. Until 1949, European children and those of Muslim collaborators followed an “A” teaching programme that opened the door for advanced studies. Programme “B” concerned three quarters of the total number of colonised children. This apartheid-like curriculum trained second-class citizens who could not progress beyond low-level vocational training (Hadjeres 1960). In sum, the European community was at an advantage, and it is worth studying it now.




Figure 2.1: European and Muslim (indigènes) enrolments in colonial primary schools, 1883-1938 (in thousands) (Colonna 1975:14)

3.2 New man in contemporary Latin Africa

At the end of the 19th century, there were major social and political changes

in Algeria. Following the 1871 uprisings in Kabylia, a mountainous region in the east of Algiers, European civilians dominated much of the colonial administration. Their number grew from 245,117 in 1872 to 633,850 in 1901, and 791,700 in 1921 (Kateb 2010). In 1870, the authorities granted full French citizenship to all Jews (Cremieux decree), and, in June 1889, all Europeans became French nationals but not the Muslims. The native population, which decreased dramatically around 1870, re-established itself at 3.3 million in 1886, then took off from 3.6 million in 1891 to 4.4 million in 1906, and 4.9 million in 1921. Between the 1920s and 1950s, the Muslims' birth-rate was ten times higher than that of the Europeans (Kateb 2010). Colonists worried about being washed overboard by a Muslim wave which, in effect, started to surge forward with the rise of Algerian nationalism in the 1920s. This nationalism grew in the diaspora in France, the Middle East and Algeria's urban centres where the rate of urbanisation rose from 16.6 in 1906 to 20.2 in 1926 (Khiar 1992). In this section and those that follow, I look at developments for both Europeans and Muslims and their relationship with each other, studied through the lens of some of their intellectuals.

The colonists' demographic growth and their appropriation of the political and administrative powers facilitated the implementation of an ever more racist and unequal system. Consequently, the use of racist language increased substantially to justify the natives' "deficiencies" and legitimise the Europeans' superiority. Colonists considered Muslims as "inferior and particularly degenerate races" (Kateb 2010:206).

One man, Louis Bertrand, proved to be instrumental in constructing the identity of European settlers and their colony, or "contemporary Latin Africa" as he called it. Bertrand argued that colonisers were directly descended from Ancient Rome and its six-century-long occupation of Algeria. He made a fetish of the Latin past, and his indifference to the Muslims made him discount the Arab and Ottoman dominations. Colonists were quick to identify themselves with the "new Latin race" as "heirs" of the Romans. They were the "new" man and "new" society, and they justified the "new" by sanctifying it as old to maintain a sense of identity (Graebner 2007; Lorcin 1995). So, descendants of Spaniards, Italians, Maltese, etc., reserved the term "Algerian" for themselves to symbolically kill the natives. Incidentally, when Algeria gained its independence in 1962, the vast majority of Europeans abruptly repatriated to France, and they swapped the term "Algerian" for Pied-Noir (Black Feet), a denomination they had not assumed before (Gosnell 2002).

The Pieds-Noirs' loss of their "homeland" comes from their rightist politics and their blindness to the Muslims, their cultures and their

languages, especially Arabic. For example, there were only 210 Arabic loanwords in colonial French, while the number of French lexical items assimilated into Algerian Arabic has been estimated at 140 out of every 1,665 words (Benrabah 2013; Lanly 1970). Among these 210 Arabic lexical borrowings, several terms convey racial prejudice and the harsh realities of everyday life dominated by unequal power relations. They include words like *balek* ("Get out of the way!"), *rodd balek* ("Look out!"), *emchi* ("Keep moving!"), *skoot* ("Shut up!") and *boujadi* ("a fool"). Their sheer number "gives the image of an offensive and violent [native] community" (Hureau 2010:279). Moreover, segregation reinforced this perception and increased the settlers' ignorance of Muslims: "In school", Algerian-born Jacques Attali writes, "we did not know any Arab because we could not see them... And the rare Arabic words I knew consisted of orders: 'Get out of the way', 'Shut up', etc" (Koubi 1979:17).

3.3 Celebrating the dehumanisation of "Arabs"

Europeans at the top of the social hierarchy did not shy from employing the words *indigene* and "Arab", two of the most notorious racist terms used to name the natives. For the purposes of this study, I will only consider the word "Arab". With it, colonists expressed their indifference towards the "anonymous figure", the Muslim. The most remarkable examples come from two novels of Pied-Noir writer Albert Camus, *The Plague* [La Peste] and *The Outsider* [L'Etranger]. Both books are devoid of Algeria's natives. *The Plague's* setting is Oran in the 1940s, the most Christian city of French Algeria with its 300,000 settlers against 150,000 natives (Chaulet-Achour 1998; Horne 1987). Camus's blindness to one third of the Oranese population comes out in the number of times he mentions the word "Arab". The novel's content reveals three occurrences of this term, on pages 22, 68 and 98 (Camus 1947). To Christiane Chaulet-Achour (1998:135), an Algerian academic of French descent, there were extenuating circumstances: "In fiction", she writes, "the echo of reality cannot always be measured against the number of words related to it." A paraphrase of novelist Chinua Achebe (1977) suffices to say that Camus's work calls into question the very humanity of the colonised.

In *The Outsider*, set in Algiers in the late 1930s, Camus's negation of Muslims as human beings strikes the reader. To Alistair Horne, "The Outsider ... perhaps personifies the Pied-Noir mentality better than any other fictional character" (1987:52). French historian Marc Ferro (2010) describes this "mentality" as fundamentally racist. In 1960, Pied-Noir writer Jules Roy confirmed Ferro's point: "One thing I knew because it was told me so often, was that the Arabs belonged to a different race, one inferior to my own" (Horne 1987:55). The central theme of *The Outsider* is the

irrational murder of the unknown “Arab” gunned down by the icy European narrator Meursault. The colon's racist blindness comes to the fore in one of the most chilling scenes in Camus's novel. After executing his victim, Meursault finds himself in a prison cell full of Muslims who laugh at him and then ask what he has done. “I said that I killed an Arab and they remained silent”, Meursault says (Camus 1942:104). Camus does not question the prisoners' silence, not even fear it.

In November 1954 when the National Liberation Front (FLN in French) launched Algeria's War of Liberation, Camus expressed his settler nationalism during the 1957 Nobel Prize ceremony in Stockholm. Asked to choose between his mother and justice, he picked the former. His nationalist mentality can also be depicted in his views on language. To him, being “Algerian” meant speaking only French, and like the majority of PiedsNoirs, he spoke no Arabic (Benrabah 2013). In truth, he had little patience with the Arabic language and the natives' Arabo-Islamic identity. For example, in a series of reports on life in Kabylia published in 1939, he denounced the French government's “arabizing their country [Kabylia] with the caïdat [Muslim administration] and with the introduction of Arabic” (Camus 1958:72). Then, during March and April 1958 in the midst of the Liberation War, he expressed his loyalty to colonial France (language governmentality) by rejecting any future independent Algeria that would humiliate France's Greatness symbolised by its colonies. Camus (1958:28) said that Algeria's liberation meant “an Islamic empire which could only bring poverty and sufferings to the Arab masses.” Consciously or unconsciously, he was faithful to his colonial mentality for he preferred “Arabs” to remain anonymous, silent and non-human, and the Arabic language to be eliminated from Algeria. As Jean Cohen put it in 1955 (590), “if the 'Arabs' want to be human beings, they have to dress like Europeans and speak French.”

Assimilation in colonial Algeria meant the supremacy of the French language and the death of other tongues, be they European (Spanish, Italian, Maltese) or indigenous, namely Arabic and Berber. France's language policies in its North African colony succeeded in turning into Frenchmen into Pieds-Noirs, like Camus who was of Spanish descent. The main agent for this success was the schooling system symbolised by its teachers who were often reminisced with gratitude by their former European and Muslim students.

In actual fact, the hierarchical education of colonial Algeria trained an indigenous elite of French expression moulded by France's dominant ideologies. From the 1920s onwards, these educated Muslims filled the vacuum created by the elimination of urban leaders in the 19th century.

Nonetheless, prior to this era, the absence of a native leadership to unite the colonised had produced a natural way of cohering in opposition to France: despised and disqualified by colonisers, Islam and the Arabic language kept alight the fires of resistance to colonialism. Then, when the three major strands of Algerian nationalism rose during the first quarter of the 20th century, they strongly focused on the Arabic language. Colonial France released, thus, a genie from the bottle. Unknown to Algerians in pre-colonial times, cultural polarisation by linguistic means so typical of French culture was appropriated by educated natives who adopted new thought patterns on language. Nationalist leaders took up the fight for cultural hegemony and turned colonial ideologies and discourses against France with devastating effects.

In the next two sections, I look at the policy of Frenchification through the three colonial ideologies defined at the beginning of this chapter. I show how colonists employed them to rationalise the so-called civilising properties of their language, and to indoctrinate the colonised.

3.4 Battle for minds

In French Algeria, the “ideology of ethnicization” served to divide and rule the natives along religious and/or language lines. Recall that, unlike Muslims, all Jews were granted French citizenship (Cremieux decree). Moreover, colonisers invented the “Berber/Kabyle myth” to divide Muslims into “superior” Berbers/Kabyles and “inferior” Arabs (Lorcin 1995:243-250).

Following the birth of the independence nationalist party - Algerian People's Party/Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms (PPA/MTLD in French) - talks on the identity of the future “Algerian nation” divided its members. Its leader, Arabic-speaking Messali Hadj (1898-1974), defended an “Arabo-Islamic” Algeria with Literary Arabic as its language (“Arabo-Islamism”). His opponents, mainly from Berberspeaking Kabylia, backed an “Algerian Algeria” with colloquial Arabic and Berber. This strife called the “Berberist crisis” ended in 1949 in favour of Messali who condemned “Berberism” as regionalist. Thus, he laid the groundwork for contested identities in pre- and post-independent Algeria (Benrabah 2013). Nonetheless, the status of Arabic and Islam as unifying forces against colonialism prevented the “Berberist crisis” from reaching the majority of Kabylia's PPA/MTLD supporters. French-language Kabyle writer Mouloud Feraoun (1913-1962) corroborates this. In his *Journal*, Feraoun reports almost daily on his experience of the Liberation War (1954-1962). On 2 February 1956, he describes a meeting held by the FLN freedom fighters in his Kabyle village. One of the villagers told him: “the

leader ... started reciting the Koran, the Surah of Al Fatiha all in Arabic. What an accent! What a tone! What a high spirit! We didn't need to understand [what he said], it was a moving experience.”(1998: 84)

As regards the “ideology of monolingualism”, France relied on schools to displace local languages and spread its tongue. For example, Algeria's Governor General between 1832 and 1833 said: “The remarkable feat would be to gradually replace Arabic by French ... which can only spread among the natives, especially if the new generation will come in numbers to be educated in our schools” (Turin 1983:40-41). Furthermore, the control over the Muslims' thought and linguistic use (language governmentality) was clearly stated by a theorist of colonial education in 1917: “To transform the primitive peoples in our colonies, to render them as devoted as possible to our cause ... the safest method is to take the native in childhood . in a word to open schools for him where his mind can be shaped at our will.” (Taleb Ibrahimi 1981:12-13)

Recall that France passed the 1883 Act to Frenchify Muslim children and minorise Arabic. Then in 1890 and 1898, the educational authorities implemented programmes to impose French monolingualism on to young natives (Colonna 1975). As for the Arabic language, it was introduced in secondary schools as a “foreign” language. Being poorly taught, students and teachers took it lightly. Those who used it during playtime faced humiliation. Born in 1931 to a Muslim father and a French mother, Betoule Fekkar-Lambiotte (2007:60-61) testifies to this: “I was destined to be bilingual, even though, when playing and speaking Arabic in the schoolyard, I was often slapped by my teachers who dictated that 'At the French school, speak French!'”

Within Algeria's nationalist movement, one party proved favourably disposed to monolingualism: the reformist Association of the Algerian Muslim Ulema (AAMU) - “Ulema” meaning “Muslim scholars”. Founded in 1931, the AAMU grounded its doctrine on the return to the first principles of Islam to regenerate Algeria (Islah). These religio-conservatives called for the integration of the “Algerian Muslim community within the great French family” (Stora 1991:75). However, after World War II, they adopted Messali Hadj's agenda until they joined the FLN in 1956. Their creed says: “Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my fatherland” (Bennoune 2000:168-169). The Ulema equated Algerian identity with their urban and bourgeois background. They rejected the faith of the majority, the rural populations and their languages, and dialectal Arabic and Berber (Homne 1987). The AAMU defended Literary Arabic as the single spoken/written language to unify both the Algerian nation and the Arabophone zone (pan-Arabism). They thus divorced from the pre-colonial

linguistic tolerance discussed above.

In truth, the Ulema followed unhesitatingly the Middle Eastern founders of pan-Arab linguistic nationalism, an imitative adaptation of Western culture that posits an essential link between a single language (Literary Arabic) and a unitary “Arab” identity. Pan-Arabism also considers local linguistic varieties divisive for the Arab nation (Benrabah 2013).

Unsurprisingly, the Ulema harboured suspicions about Algeria's Berberophones. For example, in 1948, they urged France to shut down Kabyle-language radio programmes, arguing that Kabyles would be real Algerians when they “ceased to whisper their jargon (the Kabyle language) which grates on our ears” (Ouerdane 2003:80). It must be noted here that the Ulema will strongly influence language planning in the postindependence period.

3.5 Dazzling power of French language and culture

As an expression of the “ideology of language hierarchies”, the French regarded Arabic and Berber as “nonlanguages” for they were “small languages”, “defective”, “degenerate” and “without grammatical rules” (Chaker 1981:451; Morsly 1990:81). For example, in 1886, Onesime Reclus (1886:680) described Arabic and Berber as sharing “a passion for terrible guttural sounds which resemble vomiting”. In 1931, William Marçais disqualified Literary Arabic because of its alleged incapacity to deal with the modern world. This Whorfian faith implies the French language would better instruct Muslims in the way of modernity and colonised elites internalised this rhetoric, as illustrated by Feraoun's (1998: 4) writings in 1955: “What is a native for the European? He is a man with ludicrous manners, peculiar customs, and with an impossible language.”

Such colonial discourse also influenced nationalists like Ferhat Abbas (1899-1985). In his early writings, Abbas defended assimilation and rejected a separate national identity for Algerians. With Germany's occupation of France in 1940, reformist Abbas hardened his position like the Ulema. When the War of Algeria broke out, he joined the FLN, and, in 1958, he headed the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (GPRA in French). Heretofore, Abbas had consistently called for the teaching of Arabic and he even demanded its recognition as an official language in 1943. He, nevertheless, asked France to modernise Algeria through “a powerful lever: the language of Corneille and of Racine” (Abbas 2011:130). Long after Algeria's independence, Abbas remained attached to France's culture. In the preface to the 1981 re-edition of his book, first published in 1931, he argues: “one cannot spend his youth with Pascal, Corneille, Racine, Danton, Saint-Just, Pasteur, Hugo, without acquiring a certain citizenship ... without also getting attached to this education and

regret that it had not spread amongst one's compatriots.”(2011:29) The belief in the French language being the only route to the modern world (Whorfian faith) has proved durable and it persists to this day (Benrabah 2013:78-80).

While the GPRA was successfully ending the independence war, the FLN met at Tripoli, Libya, in May-June 1962. The Tripoli meeting repudiated the GPRA leadership and sanctified the military as the backbone of independent Algeria. It also determined the political programme for the future government which was urged:

... to restore to the Arabic language, which incarnates the cultural values of the nation, its dignity and effectiveness .. our culture must be Algerian, founded on the Arabic language which is deep-rooted in the nation ... to establish scientifically a basic vocabulary of Arabic common to the countries of the Maghreb. (Murphy 1977:5)

This announcement fixed independent Algeria's language policy called Arabisation. The omission of any reference to regional languages and cultures reveals that it will be as exclusive as colonial Frenchification. Moreover, in April 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella, soon-to-be the first Head of State, resoundingly declared: “We are Arabs, we are Arabs, we are Arabs.” He, therefore, defined Algerians' national identity as “fundamentally” Arab, as an echo to Messali Hadj's choice in 1949. Nonetheless, the nationalist discourse, very effective in theorising Algerians' opposition to colonial France, would soon be confronted with the country's realities.

4. Who are we?

After France's defeat in July 1962, Algeria was completely transformed. There were 10 million inhabitants, 25 lived in towns and around one million non-Muslims left the country (Kateb 2010). Illiteracy stood at around 90% only 300,000 (5.5% could read Literary Arabic, 10.6% were literate in Arabic and French, 8.9% in French only, and 18.6% spoke Berber (Bennoune 2000; Chaker 1998). Hence, colonialism produced “a linguistic drama” hinted at by an Algerian poet/writer in 1963: “In ten to fifteen years . Arabic will have replaced French completely and English will be on its way to replacing French as a second language. French is a clear and beautiful language ... but it holds too many bitter memories for us” (Gordon 1966:113). The poet/writer raises the issue of Algerians' sense of alienation and the scars left by the colonial genocide of populations and languages. “Psychologically damaged” (Hussey 2014:67), Algerians had a “problem of identity”, and they soon asked: “Who are we?” (Déjeux 1965:6; Gordon 1966:201-202)

Debates on national identity dealt with Islam and the Arabic language. Two ideological opposites emerged: Marxists/thinkers influenced by Western progressive-materialistic theories, and the religio-conservative Ulema. The language issue concerned Arabisation and the French language. For the former, progressive thinkers called for gradual Arabisation, but their opponents insisted on its rapid implementation; the religio-conservatives chose Literary Arabic, but the opposition supported dialectical Arabic and Berber; Marxists wanted Arabic to replace French in most linguistic uses ("Arabisation"), but their opponents preferred Arabisation-Islamisation (assimilation) to provide populations with an exclusively Arabo-Islamic identity. As for the ex-colonial language, Marxists favoured its appropriation, but the opposition wanted it dead.

Following Algeria's independence, the authorities played a major role in language planning. Supporters of Arabisation held power in President Ben Bella's government (1962-1965), but there were Cabinet members who supported Arabisation-assimilation, particularly the president. For example, in October 1962, he abolished the only Chair of Berber studies at Algiers University. In return, an armed revolt erupted in Kabylia in 1963-1964. The rebels were former FLN freedom fighters who had adhered to Arabo-Islamism to transcend divisions and fight colonialism, but they unanimously refused it as Algeria's official dogma. The Kabyle rebels' defeat in 1964 led to the imposition of a monolithic identity based on Arabo-Islamism, the image of colonial Frenchification. In status planning, the authorities chose monolingualism: the first Constitution sanctified Arabic as the country's unique national/official language in September 1963. As for acquisition planning, Ben Bella did not Arabise education systematically. Confronted with the religio-conservatives' call for the total Arabisation of schools, the first Education Minister defended its gradual implementation. Yet, in September 1964, the first grade in the primary cycle was Arabised, and to compensate for the lack of Arabic-language teachers, the government recruited around 1,000 Egyptian instructors.

Ben Bella's cautious implementation of Arabisation ended with the military coup on 19 June 1965, which would deeply affect Algeria's language planning. The putsch weakened the legitimacy of the country's leaders who chose the legitimising cover of language. This meant the politicisation of the linguistic issue, and the adoption of ever more radical measures. When the coup leader, Houari Boumediene, declared his presidency to be guided by Arabo-Islamic ideals, the Ulema joined his Cabinet. The new leadership's determination to abandon Ben Bella's approach to Arabisation is best illustrated in a declaration made by Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Boumediene's first Education Minister. Taleb Ibrahimi

said:“This [Arabisation] will not work, but we have to do it” (Grandguillaume 1995:18).Arabisation-assimilation (Islamisation) in both status and acquisition planning was part of the new government's agenda. In education,it became more assertive with language governmentality clearly voiced by elites who echoed colonial discourses. In November 1965, Taleb Ibrahimi(1981:72)asked:“What kind of man do we want to train(in schools)?”Then he quoted T.S.Eliot saying:“Culture is something that must grow.You cannot build a tree; you can only plant it, and care for it, and wait for it to mature”(1981:66).He even used expressions like“a new Algerian”and “a new Algeria”,and talked about the need for new generations“to learn to think in Arabic”(1981:217-218).

4.1 Return to the sources

After Ben Bella's downfall, educational policies were focused inward, as illustrated in the teaching of history for sixth-graders, the first subject to be Arabised. From September 1966,“school-children tackled history starting not from Antiquity but from the beginnings of Islam”(Haouati 1995:56). In his writings, Taleb Ibrahimi(1981:61, 98) insists on the need to recover for Algeria her“authenticity”and“to return to the sources of Arabo-Islamic culture”.At the time, historian David Gordon(1971:20) cast doubt on Taleb Ibrahimi's project:

Taleb's theme ... raises the question ... whether the past he speaks of can, first, be resurrected in the modern world, and, second, whether the French ‘overlay'may not be, for good or bad, an intrinsic part of modern Algeria. Taleb's argument is typical of many intellectuals of new nations who are more often inspired by sensibility than historical realism.

In fact, Taleb Ibrahimi(1981:63) does not only reject the French“overlay”, he also dismisses Algeria's linguistic-cultural substratum that he describes as “this mixture of elements from ill-assorted and often contradictory cultures”. So, following the military overthrow of 1965, Algeria's history would continue to be abused with the writing and re-writing of textbooks that ignore“historical realism”.

The 1970s saw the intensification of an ever more repressive Arabisation that evokes colonial practices. For example, Berber-speaking schoolchildren were among its victims:“Speaking Kabyle [Berber] was forbidden ... Teachers punished children caught speaking Kabyle”(Sharkey 2012:438-439).Finally, in 1974, elementary education was completely Arabised,and the teaching of French as a subject began with the third-graders. Then,an experimental schooling system called the Fundamental School was implemented in 1976. It consisted of nine consecutive years with the Arabic

language serving as the medium of instruction for all subjects, with the exception of foreign languages. In 1976-1977, Boumediene made Algerians vote for the National Charter (an authoritative analysis of the national situation and goals), a new Constitution, the president, and the parliament. His Constitution confirmed Arabic as Algeria's single national/official language, and the Charter condemned Berberophones' demands for the institutionalisation of their language as "regionalism", a "social scourge to be eradicated" (Murphy 1977:7).

One year before Boumediene's death in December 1978, his government made a pause in the over-hasty Arabisation, but his successor, Chadli Bendjedid, resumed the country's systematic Arabisation. President Bendjedid generalised the Fundamental School, and the secondary cycle was fully Arabised (de-Frenchified) in 1989. Concerning status planning, "Act No. 91-05 of 16 January 1991, on the generalization of the use of the Arabic language" is probably the most important French-style Jacobin piece of legislature to be enacted since 1962. Its initiator boasted about using as his model France's "Act 75-1349 of 31 December 1975", an anti-English law driven by the fear of "Anglo-Saxon" domination (Benrabah 2013:71).

To conclude this section, I will describe the practice of elite closure in post-1962 Algeria. In truth, leaders resorted to schools operated by France to educate their children who thereby avoided institutions that catered for the masses. They chose French for good careers in modern business and technology which required competence in the ex-colonial language. As a colonial legacy, elite closure shows conflicting societal goals. It implies that French is more valuable than Arabic, and that the latter would put at a disadvantage those who choose it or are forced to study in it. This strategy expresses the rulers' reproduction of the Whorfian faith introduced by colonial France. Soon after independence, leaders who had internalised this myth maintained Arabic for prayers and French for modernity, tying henceforth Arabisation to Islamisation and Francophonie to secularisation (Ruedy 1992).

4.2 Perverted language planning

"In Algeria", James McDougall (2011:251) writes, "the official Arab-Islamic formulation of national identity has arguably been, in some respects, the most obviously artificial and imposed of all Arab nationalist rhetorics." It is a somewhat similar situation to France's forced Frenchification of Algeria, and as expected it has generated resistance from the population. This stems from the elite's internalisation of colonial ideologies which prevented them from contemplating alternatives to those of Europe/France. To them, French Jacobinism-Unitarianism based on

monolingualism and linguistic hierarchies represented the legitimate way for building modern nations. Centralised language policies are, therefore, inherently confrontational in a multilingual country like Algeria. They have produced “unplanned” developments that pervert language planning. These results involve language conflicts, the rise of conservatism/traditionalism, the lowering of standards in education and linguistic acquisition, and language shift, etc. (Benrabah 2005). Only language conflicts will be discussed here.

Soon after Boumediene's death, President Bendjedid found himself confronted with two language-related crises. The first one concerns Arabised students at Algiers University who, in November 1979, rebelled against French favouritism and the lack of economic opportunities for those graduating in Arabic. The fear of the protest being captured by Islamic fundamentalists, who had been on the rise, made the authorities Arabise the secondary and university levels, and also compel the judicial system to provide jobs for Arabised law graduates. This is how Arabisers came to dominate the country's cultural activities. Nevertheless, prestigious functions related to economic power have still been occupied so far by those competent in French.

The second conflict would prove far more challenging to the government than the Arabisers' strike. When the authorities made concessions to the Arabic-language students at the end of 1979, Kabylia went into civil disobedience in the spring of 1980. Demonstrators shouted slogans like “We are not Arabs”. Indeed, “many of the Kabyle children who went through the first Arabised schools developed in exactly the opposite way that the government intended: rather than becoming more ‘Arab’, they became more self-consciously Berber” (Sharkey 2012:439). Known as the “Berber Spring”, Kabylia's convulsions were the most serious rioting of independent Algeria: as a minority nationalism, Berberism would rock official Arabo-Islamism to its foundations; it made the language issue get the better of an allegedly invincible regime. Following these uprisings, Kabyle unrest was to be rekindled nearly every decade until the early 2000s.

Around the end of President Bendjedid's term in office, the effects of rapid social change - demographic growth, urbanisation, high literacy rates, emigration and the development of telecommunications media (e.g. satellite TV channels) - led to the youths' nationwide uprisings of October 1988. The 1988 intifada transformed Algeria's socio-political panorama. In February 1989, the authorities adopted a new Constitution which confirmed Arabic as the single national/official language, and guaranteed basic human rights, including freedom of expression (Ruedy 1992). So,

young Algerians rejected the officialised a-historical narrative and demanded a new narrative based on the history of Algeria that had been banned. The question of “Who are we?”, unanswered in the 1960s, resurfaced in the late 1980s with voices calling for the recognition of the country's complex history and linguistic-cultural pluralism (Ait Saadi Bouras 2013). At the time, Islamic fundamentalism, which had been rising since the end of the 1970s, developed into Algeria's most important movement with its own oppositional identity based on Islamic nationalism. The re-definition of Algerian-ness led to the tragic Civil War of the 1990s which “largely represented a battle of history and collective memory over how to be Algerian” (Sharkey 2012:439). On this “new” Algeria, Andrew Hussey (2014:70) observes: “During the 1990s it became all but impossible to visit Algeria. By then, reading Camus as a way-in to this Algeria was simply a waste of time.”

4.3 Recent developments

Since the 2000s, Algeria has been transformed, socio-politically and economically. The number of enrolments in primary-secondary education rose from 3.9 million in 1979 to 8.2 million in 2011. Literacy increased from 52 in 1990 to around 82.2 in 2016 (Bennoune 2000; CIA 2016). The complete Arabisation of schools in 1989 has led to the majority presumably being literate in Literary Arabic today. Moreover, the total population, which is currently estimated at 40.3 million, has quadrupled since 1962, and those under the age of 30 represent the majority. In 2015, there were 45.9 million mobile phones and 15.1 million internet users, and the rate of urbanisation stood at 70.7% (CIA 2016). Regarding the regime, it changed direction politically and ideologically as a result of the pressure exerted internally (Berber Spring, 1988 intifada, Civil War) and externally (economic globalisation). In actual fact, the inward-looking vision of Algerian-ness, dominant until the 1990s, started to give way to a pluralist approach. And centralised socialist economic planning, which characterised the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, was gradually replaced by the market economy.

In April 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika became president. His public discourse signalled, amongst other things, the advent of new language policies to supplement ongoing political and economic change (Benrabah 2005). This affected status and acquisition planning activities. When uprisings burst out in the Berber-speaking areas in April 2001, parliamentarians declared Berber a national (but not official) language in April 2002. Then the authorities hesitated for almost fourteen years before adopting “Act No. 16-01 of the 6 March 2016” to recognise Berber as Algeria's second official language. The government's long period of hesitation fuelled

Berberophones' sense of cultural marginalisation, a real catalyst for radical developments. One Berberist group, the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK in French), has jumped in to capitalise on Berber resentment. The party leader has developed a minority nationalist narrative based on the "Kabyle myth" invented by France's colonial ideologues. In June 2010, the MAK established the Provisional Government of Kabylia, and in March 2016, its leader described Algeria's regime as "colonial power" (Arab 2016).

With regard to acquisition planning, the committee established in May 2000 by President Bouteflika made, among other things, two language-related recommendations: the introduction of the French language in the second year of elementary education instead of the fourth year, and the teaching of scientific subjects in French in secondary schools. But nationalist-Islamist-conservative quarters strongly opposed these reforms, and the authorities suspended them. In September 2004, French was finally introduced for second-graders, then moved from grade 2 to grade 3 two years later. Concerning the teaching of scientific disciplines in French, it has not been implemented to this day (Oulebsir 2016:4).

It is probably in the teaching of history that the most innovations have been introduced in programmes since 2002-2003. In her comparative study of 40 history textbooks used between 1962-1963 and 2008, Lydia Ait Saadi-Bouras (2013:451) shows how schoolchildren's learning of their origins has changed with the new syllabus: "they develop young Algerians' healthy attachment to their fatherland". So, loyalty to the "Arab nation" has been replaced by loyalty to Algeria. Nevertheless, the collective identity in the new textbooks does not account for all the constituent parts of the country's complex history. For example, the Berber dimension continues to be minorised: schoolbooks present Berberophones as "separatists". In sum, schools encourage children to be loyal to Algeria, but they present Algerian-ness in truncated form. This denial suggests that an Algerian Algeria is still not part of the agenda. With the recent institutionalisation of Berber, it remains to be seen whether the questions of language and identity will continue to be in a state of chronic pathology, or they will finally be solved for the sake of socio-linguistic peace.

5. Conclusion

Lessons from Algeria's colonised and decolonised linguistic histories may be useful for understanding other cases in the world, particularly those where language planning represents a repeat performance of colonial practices.

As “new men”, the settlers of French Algeria sought legitimacy in the Roman past to disqualify indigenous people's languages and cultures, and to Frenchify them through one language (French monolingualism and language governmentality). After France's defeat, decolonised elites decided to “return to the sources” of Arab-Islamic “authenticity” to deFrenchify and Arabise Algerians through Arabic monolingualism as a form of control over their thought and language use. The policy of Frenchification and its image linguistic Arabisation were not enlightened by historical realism for they failed to account for Algeria's complex histories.

Today, this country is divided by religion, language, etc. Linguistic divisions come mainly from the colonial ideologies introduced by France and internalised by decolonised leaders who reproduced them in modern times.

The ideologies of ethnicization and monolingualism have given rise to oppositional identities based on Berberist and Islamic nationalism. Whether the recent recognition of Berber as an official language takes its toll on one colonial legacy (monolingual ideology) remains an open question. As for the ideology of language hierarchies, it still continues to plague people with the toxic Whorfian faith - French equals modernity, Arabic equals traditionalism - that prevents Arabic from being a working language in most linguistic domains. However, the remarkable spread of Arabic (de-Frenchification), and the linguistic pressures exerted by the globalised world and its linguistic voice - the English language - do not augur well for the future of the ex-colonial language in the long term. In view of France's excesses in French Algeria, this is not at all surprising.